In a new book edited by Peter L. Berger, James Davison
Hunter reflects on the fact that rhetoric aside, both relativism and
fundamentalism are “weak cultures” when they animate people and shape their
beliefs and values in a society.
On the face of it,
relativism is the foundation for a weak culture. In the case of western Europe
and North America where the structural dynamics that underwrite relativism are
most pervasive, all aspects of the dominant normative order are fragmented and
the plausibility structures that frame any particular subculture are fragile.
It is no wonder that in these societies one finds little by way of strongly
held beliefs, values, ideals, practices, and rituals shared in common. Relativism
itself, whether a philosophy or a working set of assumptions for the average
person, has no ethical coherence and it provides no language or vision for a
common future and therefore it offers few if any resources for collective
action.
By contrast,
fundamentalism asserts itself as a strong culture. However implausible,
unattractive, or impractical it is to most people, fundamentalism (in its
variety) is rooted in a strong epistemology and therefore, in a limited way, it
operates with a strong ontology, coherent ethics, and clear teleology. It is
true that against the ubiquity and force of the global economy and its
torrential flows of information, entertainment, and technology, fundamentalism
is institutionally weak. Yet the culture of fundamentalism provides a strong
normative framework for collective action.
But even as a
normative order, the various fundamentalisms are far weaker than they appear.
The weakness of fundamentalism is betrayed by its essentially negational
character, a character that takes form in its highly cultivated resentments.
What is also common to all fundamentalisms, in other words, is an identity
rooted in a narrative of injury in which the faithful understand themselves to
be victims. This narrative is reinforced by the very real external threats of
secularism (and relativism) carried by globalization, by liberal parties within
their own faith tradition, and by other hostile religions. In this light,
resentment provides a distraction from the questions and doubts forced upon
everyone to some degree by the modern world. For the fundamentalist, it is far
easier to target enemies outside of the tradition than to seek answers within
it. This is not to say that fundamentalism provides no answers to the important
questions of life or that there is no genuine faith that animates the
believers. Neither statement could be made categorically. What is true is that
the narrative of injury and the hostility it generates increasingly become the
dominant expression of the faith and the primary sources of collective identity
for the most committed believers.
Another, perhaps more
important, manifestation of the weakness of fundamentalism as a culture is the
flip side of resentment. As a culture, fundamentalism in its variety is marked
by an incapacity to make strong and constructive affirmations. As Josef Pieper
has argued, healthy and sustainable cultures make space for leisure,
philosophical reflection, scientific and intellectual mastery, and artistic and
literary expression, among other things. In a vital culture, individuals,
families, and communities are animated by the idea of bettering themselves. The
genius of all the great world religions has been their capacity to transcend
the limitations of time, environment, and human circumstance by providing
resources to imagine the horizons of progress and improvement. With
fundamentalism, however, there is an inverse relationship between militancy and
intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic vitality. Fundamentalism can point to no
creative achievements, it offers no constructive proposals for the everyday
problems that trouble most people, and it provides no vital solutions to the
problems of pluralism and change. Indeed, just the opposite.
What this means is
that it is not just contemporary relativism that is nihilistic in character. In
a different way and for different reasons, fundamentalism is every bit as
nihilistic. The bitter irony for the fundamentalist is that in the name of
resisting the internal deterioration of faith and the corruption of the world
around them, fundamentalists unwittingly embrace one of the most corrosive
aspects of this deterioration, namely, the will to power. This is one more way
in which fundamentalism expresses its intrinsically postmodern character. It
embraces a Nietzschean Zeitgeist
that, in effect, reduces all social relations (especially with non-believers)
to power relations.
Excerpted from: Between Relativism and Fundamentalism:
Religious resources for a middle position edited by Peter L. Berger (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans Publishing; 2010) pp. 32-33.
Peter L. Berger is senior research fellow at the Institute
on Culture, Religion and World Affairs at Boston University.
James Davison Hunter teaches sociology at the University of
Virginia.
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